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OPINION 
____________ 
 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 William Creagh appeals a summary judgment in favor of Certain Underwriters at 
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Lloyd’s, London, Subscribing to Policy No. SMP3791 (Lloyd’s). He also appeals the 
District Court’s order denying his motions for reconsideration and to reopen the record. 
For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.   
I 
 Because we write primarily for the parties, who are well acquainted with the case, 
we recite only the facts and procedural history essential to our decision.  
 Creagh owns a four-story building at 106 Chestnut Street in Philadelphia that 
Lloyd’s insured pursuant to a commercial and general liability policy. The second floor is 
divided into two units, an apartment and an office. The tenant of the apartment died in the 
unit, and because the tenant’s death was not immediately discovered, the decomposition 
of the body severely damaged the unit. Creagh hired two companies to remediate and 
restore the apartment.  
 Creagh submitted a claim to Lloyd’s for about $180,000 he spent to restore the 
apartment. Lloyd’s sought a declaratory judgment in the District Court that the insurance 
policy does not require it to indemnify Creagh for the property damage. Creagh brought 
three counterclaims: a claim for compensatory damages, a bad faith claim, and a claim 
that Lloyd’s violated Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection 
Law. The District Court granted summary judgment for Lloyd’s on each claim, holding 
that two policy exclusions—the microorganism exclusion and the seepage exclusion—
precluded coverage for Creagh’s claim for loss. Creagh filed motions for reconsideration 
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and to reopen the record. The District Court denied both motions, and Creagh filed this 
timely appeal.
1
 
II 
 We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s summary judgment. Horvath 
v. Keystone Health Plan E., Inc., 333 F.3d 450, 454 (3d Cir. 2003). We will affirm if the 
movant establishes that there is no genuine dispute of material fact and that judgment as a 
matter of law is appropriate. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
2
 Where, as here, our jurisdiction is 
based on the parties’ diversity of citizenship, we apply relevant state law to determine 
whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Erie R.R. Co. v. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). We review the denial of motions for reconsideration 
and to reopen the record for abuse of discretion. Gibson v. Mayor & Council of City of 
Wilmington, 355 F.3d 215, 229 (3d Cir. 2004); Max’s Seafood Cafe ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. 
v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 673 (3d Cir. 1999). 
III 
The District Court held that Creagh’s policy does not require Lloyd’s to indemnify 
him for the damage because two exclusions in the policy preclude coverage of the claim. 
                                                 
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
 
2 
The parties agreed to allow the District Court to make factual determinations.  
This is akin to the role a trial court may play during a bench trial and such factual findings 
are reviewed for clear error. See United States v. 6.45 Acres of Land, 409 F.3d 139, 145 
(3d Cir. 2005). Our review of the District Court's factual determinations reveals no error. 
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The policy’s microorganism exclusion excepts claims “directly or indirectly arising out of 
or relating to: mold, mildew, fungus, spores or other microorganism of any type, nature, 
or description, including but not limited to any substance whose presence poses an actual 
or potential threat to human health.” App. at 16. The District Court held that this 
exclusion applied because the fluids that escaped from the decedent’s body and 
contaminated the premises contained bacteria, which is a microorganism.  
The gravamen of Creagh’s appeal is that the District Court overlooked genuine 
disputes of material fact. Creagh claims the bacteria were in the body and not the bodily 
fluids that escaped and caused the damage, but Creagh offers no evidence to challenge the 
“unequivocal” statement by Lloyd’s expert that “bacteria were present in [the] bodily 
fluids that contaminated the subject property.” App. at 570. Next, Creagh contends the 
purpose of the restoration work was to rid the apartment of its smell, and that Creagh did 
not ask the contractors to remove the bacteria. However, Creagh’s subjective purpose is 
immaterial to the insurance policy. Under the microorganism exclusion, it suffices that 
the smell and other damages “directly or indirectly [arose] out of” the bacteria, which 
caused the fluid to escape the body and grew in the fluid after it left the body. We find no 
fault in the District Court’s application of this provision.   
The District Court also held that the policy’s seepage exclusion precluded 
coverage for Creagh’s claim. That exclusion excepts claims “aris[ing] from any kind of 
seepage or any kind of pollution and/or contamination . . . .” App. at 16. Creagh argues 
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that under the interpretive canon of ejusdem generis, we must read “seepage” to be 
polluting or contaminating. We need not call upon canons of interpretation for guidance, 
however, because the seepage exclusion is unambiguous as applied here. The next 
sentence in the seepage exclusion explains that “[t]he term ‘any kind of seepage or any 
kind of pollution and/or contamination’ as used in this Endorsement includes, (but is not 
limited to) . . . the presence, existence, or release of anything which endangers or 
threatens to endanger the health, safety, or welfare of persons or the environment.” App. 
at 16. We need not expound upon the District Court’s detailed explanation that the fluids 
contaminating the apartment were a health and safety threat. As the District Court 
explained, the safety precautions that Creagh’s sanitation contractor took and the 
classification by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration of such bodily fluids 
as potentially toxic and hazardous demonstrate the health and safety risk posed by the 
fluids. We agree with the District Court’s conclusion that the seepage exclusion applies to 
Creagh’s claim as well.3 
 Finally, Creagh appeals the District Court’s denial of his motions for 
reconsideration and to reopen the record. Creagh’s motion for reconsideration argued that 
                                                 
3 Creagh also appeals the District Court’s summary judgment on two of his 
counterclaims. Creagh brought a counterclaim for bad faith, saying Lloyd’s had no 
reasonable basis for denying coverage. Creagh also pleaded a counterclaim under the 
Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law on grounds that 
Lloyd’s misrepresented the fact that bacteria caused the odor in the apartment. These 
claims are baseless for the reasons we have provided. 
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the District Court erred by finding evidence of bacteria in the fluids because the fluids 
were not tested. The District Court dismissed the motion, noting it directly addressed and 
dismissed this argument in its opinion. Creagh’s motion to reopen the record sought to 
introduce new evidence allegedly undermining Lloyd’s expert opinion. Courts have great 
flexibility in deciding motions to reopen the record, and generally do not disturb final 
judgments so a litigant may introduce evidence that was previously available. See Gibson, 
355 F.3d at 229; Max’s Seafood, 176 F.3d at 677–78. Creagh did not argue that the new 
evidence was unavailable before final judgment, and the District Court dismissed the 
motion. We perceive no abuse of discretion in that decision. 
IV 
 For the reasons stated, we will affirm both the District Court’s summary judgment 
and its order denying Creagh’s motions for reconsideration and to reopen the record. 
